




















On Sunday 20 January 1907 Big Jim Larkin disembarked from a cross-channel ferry at Belfast to attend the British Labour Party annual conference and, he hoped, re-organise the Irish ports for the Liverpool-based National Union of Dock Labourers (NUDL).​[2]​ He made his way with a slouching, gangly gait, without which Irish history might have been quite different. The cumbersomeness had denied him a place in the senior team at Liverpool Football Club, and he was not the man to stay in the reserves.​[3]​ 
For the watching detectives, he was easy to read. A black broad-brimmed hat provided the bohemian touch affected by British socialists of the fin de siecle, while his muscular frame, shovel-like hands, worn old great-coat, and thick, droopy moustache, betrayed his fifteen years as a Merseyside docker. Less obviously, Belfast was a kind of home-coming for Larkin. Though he is not known to have set foot in Ireland since his birth in Liverpool in 1874, his parents had emigrated from Ulster, and he would insist, from 1909 at latest, that he too was an Ulsterman, born and bred in the maternal family homestead in south Down.​[4]​ Coincidentally, in that year, he left the NUDL to launch the Irish Transport and General Workers’ Union (ITGWU), and begin that “conflict with the egotistically narrow and imperially arrogant trade unionism of Britain”.
Two others who would be instrumental in the pursuit of syndicalism and industrial unionism in Ireland were James Connolly and William O’Brien. Connolly was the polar opposite of Larkin in temperament and style, but they had much in common in their background and politics. Connolly also claimed an Ulster nativity, although he was born in Edinburgh in 1868: at least his parents were of that opinion.​[5]​ Following activism in the Scottish wing of the Social Democratic Federation, Connolly settled in Dublin in 1896, and founded the Irish Socialist Republican Party on the theses with which he is most identified: the Irish national struggle was also a social struggle, only the working class could complete the struggle, and only socialism could guarantee real economic independence. In 1903 he moved on to the United States (US). He had already been attracted to the ideas of Daniel De Leon and the Socialist Labour Party, and would be impressed by the Industrial Workers of the World. The essence of his revolutionary industrial unionism was summed up in his pamphlet Socialism Made Easy in 1908. 
Returning to Dublin in 1910, Connolly became an official of the ITGWU in 1911, and succeeded Larkin as head of the union in 1914. In public history, both were equally towering leaders at this time, and complimentary book-ends: Connolly being the political revolutionist and nationalist, and Larkin being the union agitator and internationalist.​[6]​ In reality, Larkin was by far the more important of the two during the first phase of syndicalist unrest, from 1907 to 1914: indeed militancy in these years was usually called “Larkinism”. 
Brilliant as a polemicist, Connolly was never very effective as an agitator: according to the wags, the Irish Socialist Republican Party had more syllables than members. And it was Larkin who first consolidated a socialist republican voice within the Labour movement, for whilst there is no evidence that either influenced – or liked – the other, both reached similar conclusions on Labour strategy and on the national question.​[7]​ Connolly’s influence followed his execution by a British firing squad in the wake of the Easter Rising of 1916, which made him Labour’s national martyr. Socialism Made Easy would have a seminal impact on the ITGWU during the second wave of syndicalism, from 1917 to 1923. 
O’Brien had been a disciple of Connolly’s in the Irish Socialist Republican Party.​[8]​ Born in Cork in 1881, he worked as a tailor in Dublin until 1917, and was a prominent behind-the-scenes director of operations in the engine rooms of various Labour initiatives. O’Brien had nothing of Larkin’s charisma or Connolly’s interest in theory. Cold and reserved, his forte was administration rather than agitation. Equally, he was shrewd, capable, and ruthless in his ambition. Joining the ITGWU in 1917, he soon became the most powerful officer in Ireland’s most powerful union; a status he guarded jealously until his retirement in 1946. Enigmatically, he combined a near filial devotion to Connolly with a pragmatic, managerial approach to trade unionism. His relevance to this story rests chiefly on his pursuit of industrial unionism in the 1930s, which forms a postscript to Irish syndicalism.
There was never a formally syndicalist organisation in Ireland – even if the ITGWU came close at times – which partly explains why the phenomenon has been virtually ignored by historians.​[9]​ Neither was there a tradition of socialist debate in the Labour movement. An Irish Trades Union Congress (ITUC), modelled on its British namesake, had been founded in 1894. Notionally, it created a Labour Party in 1912, but the party did not contest a general election until 1922. 
What Irish syndicalism amounted to was Larkinism and, from 1917 to 1923, Connolly’s industrial unionism, and these were applied to structures that were not syndicalist in conception. Irish syndicalism was therefore amorphous, and contingent. And yet it had a major and recognizable impact on Labour for two reasons. First, it seemed to answer the problem of how to unionize the mass of workers in an undeveloped economy. Secondly, it interacted with the redefinition of Labour in Ireland as an Irish Labour movement. 
Leon Trotsky’s observation on the Easter Rising exaggerated the revolutionism of Irish workers in 1916: Connolly’s Irish Citizen Army led little more than 200 workers to join the Irish Volunteers in the Rising. But Trotsky did grasp the triangle of factors – syndicalism, nationalism, and British trade unionism – that were shaping Labour’s evolution at this time. Ireland in the 1900s was notionally a region of the British Labour movement. The more radical activists were coming to question the value of the link with British Labour, and syndicalism and industrial unionism appeared to offer a better alternative. As one couldn’t build an Irish movement without breaking away from British unions, nationalism and syndicalism became inextricably connected. 

Transport and general unionism
The history of Irish trade​ unionism in the 19th century mirrored the country’s uneven economic development.​[10]​ Supplying food and textiles to emergent industrial Britain and provisioning the transantlantic trade in the 18th century had stimulated an “economic miracle” in Ireland. A growth in population, from 2.5 million in 1753 to 6.8 million in 1821, encouraged the growth of trades and trade unions. In the decade after the repeal of the anti-trade union Combination Acts in 1824, Dublin was regarded as the strongest centre of trade​ unionism in the United Kingdom (UK). Labour bodies were active too in other Irish cities and among agricultural workers. However their power reflected the failure of employers to advance from craft​-based to factory-​based production, and they were, as they realized themselves, living on borrowed time. 
The political union of Ireland and Britain in 1800 was followed by a customs and monetary union in 1825. Unable to compete with the ‘workshop of the world’, Irish proto-​industries sank into decay. Economic decline, the Great Famine of 1845-50, and high emigration reduced the population from 8.2 million to 4.4 million between 1841 and 1911. Only in the Belfast region did capitalist colonization generate a limited industrialization, in textiles, engineering, and shipbuilding. Elsewhere, the economy became massively dependent on agricultural exports to Britain. 
When the south of Ireland won de facto independence as the Irish Free State in 1922, agriculture employed over half the labour force, agriculture, food, and drink accounted for 86 percent of exports, and 98 percent of exports went to the UK.​[11]​ Economic differences between Ulster and the south underpinned religious and political differences. Whereas the southern provinces were overwhelmingly Catholic, Ulster was largely Protestant. From 1886, the nationalist demand for ‘Home Rule’, or self-government within the UK, provoked a counter-mobilization of Unionism in Ulster, and intermittent crises until the constitutional settlement of 1922.
The dimensions of the problems confronting Irish trade​ unionism may be gauged from the census of 1911. Of some 900,000 employees, 348,670 were classed as agricultural or general labourers, 170,749 were in domestic or related service, and 201,717 worked in textiles and dressmaking. Thus, over seven out of every nine employees were to be found in largely unorganised, subsistence-waged employment. Trade unions were located mainly in the shipbuilding and engineering trades (30,234 workers); construction (which included 49,445 craftsmen); the tiny skilled grades in textiles and clothing; and the constellation of butchers, bakers, and candlestick-makers who held such a high profile in the pre-​Larkinite ITUC. 
Labour’s weakness was exacerbated by the concentration of manufacture in Ulster, and its fraught political relationship with the rest of Ireland. Trade unions in Belfast’s metal trades, for example, were not affiliated to Congress and scarcely a part of the Irish Labour movement. Membership of Congress in 1911 was given as 50,000, and as this figure included trades councils – local committees of unions – the real level of membership was probably about 30,000.​[12]​ The weakness of the craft unions gave unskilled workers, potentially, a great importance. Any union that managed to recruit a fraction of general workers would be in a position to dominate the ITUC.
Among general workers, those employed in transport and essential services, who operated at the hinges of commercial infrastructure where strikes would have an immediate and widespread effect, were most favourably placed to take successful industrial action. Transport was also a growth sector. The 1891 census noted 38,231 “persons engaged on railways, roads, rivers, seas, storage, conveyancing messages etc”, and by 1911 the number had risen to 62,947. Here was the Achilles heel of Irish employers. Between 1907 and 1912 transport accounted for an annual average of 12 percent of strikers and under 4 percent of strike days in the UK. In Ireland, it accounted for 22 percent of strikes, 33 percent of strikers, and 33 percent of strike days over the same period.​[13]​
	Transport unions played a leading role in each of three waves of militancy that transformed Irish Labour between 1889 and 1923. It is evident too that because of their own weakness, unions and workers in other sectors were willing to support transport workers when they gave a lead. The first of the three waves was powered by the extension of British ‘new unionism’ to Ireland between 1889 and 1891. The new unions organised unskilled workers and were more militant and more influenced by socialists than the craft unions, which held them in some suspicion.​[14]​ Irish new unionism was pioneered by seafarers’ and dockside unions, and similar in character to its British counterpart, except that Irish craftsmen were notably sympathetic to the fraternity of “trade and spade”. Trades councils, for example, while dominated by artisans, sponsored May Day parades, encouraged Labour politics, and sought to speak for workers as a whole. During the Larkinite phase, transport workers would act as a bridge to other general workers. In the third wave, from 1917 to 1923, the ITGWU acquired a guiding influence and diffused a syndicalist character to unrest. The continuities in theme between Larkinism and the later syndicalism are remarkable, the more so as Larkin was in the US between 1914 and 1923. 

Larkinism
What began, in January 1907, as a revival of new unionism, quickly evolved into Larkinism. Employers coined the term, as short​hand for militancy, the cult of the agitator, and the sympathetic strike, and to distinguish these from what they called “bona fide trade ​unionism”. In the extensive literature on the topic, little of which is both substantial and scholarly, Larkinism is usually treated simply as the cult of Big Jim.​[15]​ There was certainly a personality cult, which Jim would promote shamelessly. And Larkin did not try to express his ideas in any systematic way. Yet there was in Larkinism a method, a morality, a politics, and a strategy, all of which were syndicalism in some degree. 
In line with NUDL policy, Larkin had set out to recruit dockers only and pursue improvements in conditions without strikes.​[16]​ Within weeks, allied workers were seeking to join the union, and within months Larkin was being drawn into strikes by a combination of membership spontaneity and employer militancy. The Belfast dock strike of 1907 established his reputation. It was typical of Larkin that he would oppose strike action at first, but once convinced that conflict was unavoidable, he would mobilize all possible forces behind it and extend action to overstretch the employers and police. In June he escalated sectional disputes into a general strike in the port of Belfast. The mythology soon followed. 
The sectarianism for which Belfast was notorious created deep divisions between workers, and the city’s Catholic minority of some 25 percent formed a subaltern caste. It was said that Larkin led Catholics and Protestants in a parade on 12 July, when Protestants annually celebrated the victory of King William of Orange over a Catholic army in 1690, and that he incited the police to mutiny. In fact, he spent the 12th in Liverpool with his ailing mother, and had no direct part in the police action. 
As with most myths, the facts embellished an essential truth, and Larkin did forge a brief, exultant unity across the religious divide, climaxing on 26 July when 100,000 people turned out for a trades council parade, which pointedly wound its way around the (Catholic) Falls and (Protestant) Shankill roads. The extraordinary atmosphere attracted a stream of visitors from the British left, and they were not disappointed. John Maclean wrote home: “Addressed strikers at night. Audience of thousands. Labourers mad to join trade unions”.​[17]​ Famously, on 24 July, the police buckled under the burden of their additional duties, assembled to demand better pay and conditions, and fraternized with the strikers. The government promptly rusticated 270 constables and rushed in 6,000 troops.​[18]​ Generalized action and sympathetic action, whether in the form of blacking “tainted goods” or striking in support, became the standard fallback tactics in Larkin’s method of industrial warfare. 
Larkin underpinned his method with a morality, emphasizing repeatedly that workers’ solidarity was a code of honour. Like many socialists of the fin de siecle, he was essentially a moralist. Arguably, as early as 1911 he was more interested in revolutionizing popular values than in the mundane work of organisation. As soon as he had placed the ITGWU on a stable footing, he founded a newspaper, the Irish Worker. The first issue, on 27 May 1911, sold about 5,000 copies. Within weeks, sales were above 20,000 per week. Over a period of forty-one months, Larkin edited 189 issues, and wrote the editorials and more than 400 articles.​[19]​ He campaigned for temperance and played an active part in developing values such as sharing, fraternity, co​-operation, and collectivism, as a counter​culture to possessive individualism. In 1914 he told a meeting in Sheffield: “Get in the co-​operative movement. Make it a real co-​operative movement. Build up round your Trade Union, as we do in Dublin, every social movement, every part of your material side of life. Make your centre of Trade Unionism a centre of all your life and activities”.​[20]​ He had taken steps in this direction in the ITGWU’s head office, Liberty Hall, which hosted classes in music and drama, and in renting Croydon Park House as a recreation centre where union members and their families could enjoy social and sports activities. As Larkin put it, “we make our family life focus around the union…”.​[21]​ 
As early as the summer of 1907, the NUDL general secretary, James Sexton, had come to regard Larkin as a dangerous militant. Sexton saw no need for the NUDL to recruit other than dockers, or support generalized action. Larkin determined to follow his own course, and in December 1908 he was suspended from his job.​[22]​ With little alternative, he formed his own union, and confronted the great strategic question facing Irish Labour. 
British unions – “the amalgamateds” as they were often called, as so many were originally styled “amalgamated society of…” – had been extending to Ireland since the 1840s, absorbing the smaller Irish societies. By 1900 some 75 percent of Irish trade unionists belonged to the amalgamateds and, despite the existence of the ITUC, they looked to Britain for leadership, example, and organisation.​[23]​ Having launched an Irish union, Larkin made a virtue of necessity. The preamble to the ITGWU’s first rule book asked: “Are we going to continue the policy of grafting ourselves on the English Trades Union movement, losing our identity as a nation in the great world of organised labour? We say emphatically, No. Ireland has politically reached her manhood”.​[24]​
Between 1909 and 1914, Larkin moved ever closer to the Irish​-Ireland movement associated with bodies like the Gaelic League and Sinn Féin (“Ourselves”), which sought the displacement of “anglicization” with a spirit of self-reliance. From this politics the ITGWU acquired a vision that would make it Ireland’s premier union. Its success eventually delivered a terminal blow to the crippling policy of dependency on Britain and laid the basis of the modern Irish Labour movement. This would be Larkin’s most enduring achievement, and there is overwhelming evidence that the politics of Larkinism was socialist republican. Yet Larkin’s nationalism would be obliterated as subsequent Labour leaders and literati such as Seán O’Casey and James Plunkett chose to commemorate him purely as a socialist.​[25]​
	Strategically, Larkin’s thinking shifted incrementally from new unionism to industrial unionism. In 1909 his priority was to get the ITGWU accepted as a union and affiliated to the ITUC. In 1910 he attended the inaugural conference of the Industrial Syndicalist Education League at Manchester, and told delegates that “his union was formed on the industrial basis, and took in all workers in the transport industry. The transport industry held the key, for they could stop the whole of the rest of the trades”.​[26]​ In 1912, the year he became chairman of a largely Larkinite ITUC executive, he called for one big union. “Tomorrow”, he declared on the eve of the 1912 annual congress, “We are going to advocate one society for Ireland for skilled and unskilled workers, so that when a skilled man is struck at, out comes the unskilled man, and when an unskilled worker is struck at, he will be supported by the skilled tradesman”.​[27]​ At the Congress his proposal for an Irish Federation of Trades met with resistance from the British and some Irish craft unions and was defeated by 28−23 votes. 
Larkin and Connolly had more success in persuading the 1912 Congress to agree to form a Labour Party. Both combined a conception of electoral politics as “the echo of the [industrial] battle”, with a belief in a “two arms strategy”. In 1914 the ITUC became the ITUC and Labour Party. To politicize the unions and ensure their control over the politicians, the Congress and Party were one and the same, with no separate political machinery.​[28]​ Here again, there was a nationalist dimension, as prior to 1912 the ITUC had regularly urged affiliates to support the British Labour Party, an injunction applied only in Belfast. 
Larkinism was, of course, driven also by employers. What little has been written on employer policy in Ireland before the 1960s has focused on economics rather than industrial relations.​[29]​ But what evidence we have points consistently to the fact that if employers were prepared to accept craft unions, they were hostile to the unionization of unskilled workers; regarded Larkinism, sympathetic strikes, and syndicalism as synonymous; and saw Larkin as the instigator of syndicalist doctrines which endangered the basis of the economy itself.
	The distinction between skilled and unskilled was most acute in Ireland’s industrial capital. The proportion of unionized men in the metal trades in Belfast in 1900 exceeded the UK average. Unlike their British colleagues, Belfast engineering employers made no attempt to break trade unions in the 1860s and 1870s. As early as 1872 the Belfast Employers’ Association had negotiated directly with unions on wages and conditions. Between 1860 and 1900, skilled rates in the city rose faster than in Britain, and due to the scarcity of artisans and abundance of labourers, the differential between skilled and unskilled wages in Belfast exceeded the UK average, sometimes reaching a ratio of 3:1.​[30]​ 
However the coal heavers who joined the NUDL in 1907 were treated quite differently. They were dismissed and, according to Gray: their employer “stated very clearly the prevailing view of Belfast’s employers when he said, ‘the situation at issue had no reference to wages whatsoever; it was merely as to whether the dockers should associate themselves with a union which he considered should not embrace such a class of employment’”.​[31]​ 
Employers were less well organised in the south of Ireland, but they responded to Larkinism in a similar fashion. Federations, created expressly to combat strikes, were formed in Cork in 1909 and Galway in 1911. Within weeks of the ITGWU forming a branch in Wexford in 1911, the town’s major employers gave notice that no member of the union would be employed and locked out 700 men.​[32]​ The September 1911 rail strike popularized the idea of employer federation. The dispute originated in the dismissal of two porters at Kingsbridge (now Heuston) station, Dublin, for refusing to handle “tainted goods”. As spontaneous action erupted along the railway, the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants attempted to assert its authority by calling a national strike on 21 September. The decision drew a torrent of criticism in the media, which railed against “foreign” ideas in Irish industrial relations, and alarmed employers. Dublin Chamber of Commerce met in emergency session and urged employers to organise against what one employer termed “not a strike in the ordinary sense…but the beginning of a social war”.​[33]​ 
Within weeks, local employers’ federations were being formed throughout the country. William Martin Murphy, chairman of the Dublin United Tramways Company, owner of the Irish Independent newspaper, vice ​president of the Dublin Chamber, and president in 1913−14, and Dublin’s puissant capitalist, was impressed with the railway directors’ handling of the crisis. The largest company, the Great Southern and Western, locked out 1,600 workers by closing the railway workshops and imported labour from England. When the strike collapsed on 4 October 1911, the Great Southern refused to re​-employ 10 percent of the strikers, and re-​engaged others at reduced rates; men recruited during the strike were retained, and those who had stayed at work were rewarded with bonuses. So pleased were the directors with crushing Larkinism, that they marked the occasion with the gift of a clock to each of 121 station masters.​[34]​ 

The 1913 Dublin Lockout
To the dismay of other employers, the defeat of the railwaymen did not arrest the contemporary strike wave or restrain the use of sympathetic action. The employers blamed Larkin, but they also blamed the Liberal government – for introducing the Trades Disputes Act 1906 and the National Insurance Act 1911, and for its “supineness” towards trade unions – and its minions in the administration in Dublin Castle.​[35]​ After the police mutiny in Belfast in 1907, the authorities were nervous about confronting Larkin. Police unrest in Unionist Ulster was bad enough: a mutiny in nationalist Dublin was not to be risked. That in turn made Dublin employers fearful of emulating their provincial colleagues and the railway companies in using strike-breakers. 
Murphy however, was determined never to recognize Larkin’s union. He made no secret of the fact that his quarrel with Liberty Hall was not about wages and conditions. Business, he told his colleagues, could not survive the “system known as ‘syndicalism’ or ‘sympathetic strikes’”.​[36]​ There was a personal dimension to the antagonism, and more so for Murphy than Larkin. If the Irish Worker had vilified Murphy repeatedly as the epitome of sweating capitalism, ad hominem abuse was Larkin’s way: it served his compulsion to put a face on the enemy. He had no ulterior motive in challenging Murphy. He had always believed that the financial future of the ITGWU depended on pushing into steady employment areas such as the railway and Murphy’s splendid tramway system. On the other hand, when Murphy called Larkin a “mean thief” and expressed surprise that artisans should associate with “scum like Larkin and his followers”, he was not playing to the gallery.​[37]​ 
Murphy prepared his ground well. One week before the ITGWU struck the trams, he visited Dublin Castle and emerged with firm assurances of adequate protection in the event of trouble. On 3 September he chaired a meeting of 404 employers, who agreed to dismiss all workers who would not sign a document obliging them to carry out their employers’ instructions and in no way support the ITGWU. It was expected that, as in the rail strike, union opposition would crumble quickly. By the end of September, a strike of perhaps 340 men had led to a lockout of over 20,000 workers in a city of 300,000 people. 
In the public memory, the lockout is synonymous with Larkinism, and its raw class solidarity understood as a by​-product of Dublin’s appalling social conditions.​[38]​ Yet Larkinism began in Belfast, where, in 1903, 1 percent of families lived in one room tenements, compared with 26 percent in Glasgow, and 35 percent in Dublin.​[39]​ Protagonists had no doubt that syndicalism lurked at the heart of the lockout. The Board of Trade conciliator, George Askwith, recalled that while British strikes of the period were “chiefly based upon economic issues, the serious riots in Dublin, although founded on poverty, low wages and bad conditions, included the determination to establish the transport workers’ union as ‘the one big union’ in Ireland and put into practice the doctrines of syndicalism”.​[40]​ 
Wright, the employers’ historian of the conflict, represented his patrons as defending the protocols of responsible labour-management against the impossible Mr Larkin and his reckless syndicalist belief in the sympathetic strike, and stressed the influence of the government’s failure to contain industrial unrest in England.​[41]​ More surprisingly perhaps, it is easy to find Labour voices in agreement with Askwith. W.P. Ryan, assistant editor of the Daily Herald, the voice of the “rebels” on the British left, also placed syndicalism at the kernel of the dispute, adding that the employers “were quite correct from their point of view”.​[42]​ The first academic history of Irish labour, written in 1925, offered a similar analysis.​[43]​
Resistance to the lockout finally crumbled in January 1914. The ITGWU emerged from the ordeal more aggressively nationalist. There were various reasons for the shift in emphasis. Since the strike wave of 1911, Larkinism had begun to differentiate nationalists on the social question. Supporters of the constitutional nationalist Home Rule party tended to be hostile, while those in the leading republican organisation, the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), were more sympathetic. 
The lockout itself generated the first intellectual explorations in socialist republicanism outside of Connolly’s writing. P.H. Pearse, who would mastermind the Easter Rising, wrote, in a polemic against the employers: “A free Ireland would not, could not, have hunger in her fertile vales and squalor in her cities…” As Yeates has noted, the contention that a republic would be socially inclusive mirrored Connolly’s line that only under socialism would Ireland be free, and “the practical conclusions for future political action were almost identical”.​[44]​ Ryan penned the pamphlet The Labour Revolt and Larkinism: the Later Irish Pioneers and the Co-operative Commonwealth (1913) which envisaged Larkinism, the co-operative movement, and politico-cultural forces like Sinn Féin and the Gaelic League remaking the Gaelic communism romanticized by Connolly in Labour in Irish History. 

The Citzen’s Citizen Army and the Easter Rising
At a personal level, Larkin wanted a distraction from the burden of running a bankrupt union, and Ireland was in the throes of the third Home Rule crisis. Though usually associated with Connolly, it was Larkin who led the ITGWU in a more openly republican direction. The Citizen Army, created in November 1913 to protect workers from the police, was transformed from a picket-militia into a pocket army.​[45]​ When the government announced its intention to accommodate Unionists by partitioning Ireland, Larkin was beside himself with anger. 
Connolly’s observation that partition would mean “a carnival of reaction both North and South” has often been treated as a unique prophetic insight, but it was exceptional only in its eloquence. The bulk of Labour activists, in Britain and Ireland, regarded Unionism as politically organised sectarianism, and believed that dividing Ireland along religious lines would create two reactionary, confessional states. Congress sponsored an anti-partition meeting on 5 April 1914 and condemned partition at its annual conference in June by 84-2 votes, with eight delegates unrecorded: twenty delegates from Ulster, and four from Britain, attended the Congress.​[46]​ 
The Ulstermen may not have spoken for the majority of their members, but they probably reflected the views of northern Labour activists, most of who were not nationalists, but were fearful of being locked into a sectarian statelet. Each of the previous Home Rule crises, in 1886 and 1893, had seen Catholics forced from their jobs in Belfast. During the third crisis, in 1912, 3,000 workers were victimized by loyalists. On this occasion, men of all religions were targeted, and about 600 were Protestant, expelled for their Labour or Liberal, and therefore anti-partitionist, sympathies.​[47]​ Larkin’s response to the world war was exactly the same as Connolly’s. Even before events in the Balkans engulfed Europe, the Irish Worker called on “every man who believed in Ireland as a nation to act now. England’s need, our opportunity. The men are ready. The guns must be got, and at once”. On the outbreak of war, Larkin had his boyhood friend, Fred Bower, smuggle a few guns from Liverpool.​[48]​ 
In October 1914, under the guise of a fund-raising trip, Larkin abandoned the stricken ITGWU for a new career as a globe-trotting, freelance agitator. He remained the ITGWU’s titular general secretary. Connolly became acting general secretary of the union, commandant of the Citizen Army, and editor of the Irish Worker. Labour generally was adversely affected by the lockout, and the ITGWU became increasingly isolated within the trade union movement. Its membership had now fallen from some 20,000 on the eve of the lockout to about 5,000. Within the union executive there was mounting unease about Connolly’s repeated calls for an insurrection, and it came close to repudiating the Citizen Army on the eve of Easter Week, 1916. 
Like the government, Connolly believed the IRB would never seize the moment, until January 1916, when he was made privy to their plans. The Rising was to have German military aid, and coincide with the German offensive at Verdun. Though Connolly used Liberty Hall as a base for preparations, he made no effort to involve the union in the conspiracy, which, naturally, had to be secret. Liberty Hall was nonetheless shelled by the British during the week-long insurrection, and the ITGWU was widely regarded as a participant. Initially, public opinion seemed hostile to the rebels who had brought war to the streets of Dublin.​[49]​ Anxious about employer demands that Labour be held legally responsible for the damage to property, the ITUC dissociated itself from the insurgents in its annual report for 1916. It seemed that Larkinism was as dead as Connolly himself.​[50]​ 

The ‘red flag times’
Within three years of the Rising, Labour was on the march again, militant, radical, and more influenced by syndicalism than ever before. The primary cause of this change of fortune was the world war. Secondary factors were the climate of class struggle internationally and the political revolution at home. The executions and arrests that followed the Easter Rising swung public opinion away from the Home Rulers to the separatists, who took control of Sinn Féin in 1917, and then won seventy three of Ireland’s 105 seats in the UK parliament in the general election of December 1918. 
On 21 January 1919, Sinn Féin MPs constituted themselves as Dáil Éireann (the Assembly of Ireland), declared Ireland a republic, and set about building a counter-state to the colonial administration. That same day, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) began the War of Independence with an attack on a police escort. Britain tried to suppress both the Dáil government and the IRA, until a truce was accepted in July 1921. The majority of Sinn Féin agreed to the Anglo-Irish treaty of 6 December 1921, which made the south of Ireland a self-governing dominion of the empire, and left most of Ulster within the UK. The majority of the IRA tried to sustain the struggle for total independence, until crushed in the Civil War of 1922-3.
	For workers on the home front, the world war was one of two halves. Meeting the needs of Britain's war economy brought great prosperity to Irish employers.​[51]​ Employees were less fortunate. Wages failed to match inflation from 1914 to 1916, causing hardship and accusations of profiteering against the propertied classes. But if the first half of the war stored up social grievances, production demands and the growing manpower shortage after 1916 provided the means of redress. The pre-conditions of wage improvement materialized in two ways; through government intervention to increase pay in war-related industries, and, later, through the all-round economic improvement. After the war, the release of “pent-up” consumer demand generated a brief economic boom. Wages generally rose faster than prices from 1916, overtaking pre-war levels by 1919-20, until the economy hit a disastrous slump in 1920-21. Given the nature of capitalism, the money was only for those who could get it. 
Trade unionism exploded in all directions; from under 100,000 in 1916, membership affiliated to Congress reached 225,000 in 1920. Trades councils multiplied, to fifteen by 1918 and forty six by 1921.​[52]​ Symbolic of the new values was their titular rejection of “trades and labour” in favour of “workers’ council”. 
State intervention remained a key determinant of wage movements for the first three years of the war. Though the initial effect of statutory control was to freeze wages, from 1915 onwards intervention became a means of securing war bonuses or minimum rates. Importance to the war effort and good organisation were therefore essential for successful militancy. Ireland's piecemeal integration into the war economy created a time-lag in wage movements between employment sectors.​[53]​ 
“Old sectors”, i.e. those with a history of trade unionism, were the first to recoup lost ground. Seamen and dockers won pay advances in 1915. The government took control of the shipyards and railways in 1916, making provision for the payment of war bonuses. Aerodrome and other military construction, together with the repair of Dublin's shell torn city centre, revived the building line in 1917-18. Building became particularly strike-prone after mid 1918. Almost 19 percent of all strikers between 1914 and 1921 were building workers.​[54]​ The introduction of statutory minimum rates in agriculture in 1917 finally enabled “new sectors” to join the wages movement over the next two years. 
Government regulation and the interventionist momentum persisted into the post-war era, partly in response to fears of class conflict. The recommendations of the Whitley committee, appointed to investigate wartime industrial unrest in Britain, led to the Trade Boards Act (1918). An Irish Department of the British Ministry of Labour was set up in July 1919, and by August 1920 there were nineteen trade boards covering 148,000 employees, the bulk of them in Ulster's textile and clothing industries.​[55]​
The war mobilized industry without restructuring the workforce. Ulster was the main beneficiary. Textiles, clothing, engineering, and shipbuilding were soon harnessed to military needs, but no sizable munitions sector developed in Ulster, while Unionist and British employer determination to freeze nationalist Ireland out of lucrative war contracts kept the south de-industrialized. The few munitions factories distributed to mollify nationalist outrage did not commence production until 1917, and employed a mere 2,169 persons by the armistice.​[56]​
As a result, southern wage movements were compelled to be the cause as much as the consequence of state intervention. This, together with the more primitive condition of industrial relations in which they operated, gave them a more militant character, and strikes lit the path of trade unionism to new sectors and new regions. Strike activity increased steadily from 1915 to the armistice. The level of conflict declined in 1919 as rising unemployment yielded quickly to an economic boom, but militancy reached new heights in 1920, before receding sharply with the onset of the slump and the gradual fall in the cost of living towards the end of that year. 
For their impact on the character of trade unionism, the most important state interventions were those on the railway and in agriculture. Under severe rank and file pressure, the London-based National Union of Railwaymen (NUR) sanctioned a national strike in Ireland in December 1916. As private interests would not meet the pay demand, the government stepped in to keep the war effort running smoothly, took control of Ireland's thirty two railway companies, and awarded a substantial war bonus. Over the next nine months the NUR's Irish affiliation rocketed from 5,000 to 17,000 members.​[57]​ It was a victory for the rank and file over the union’s London executive, as well as for the union over the railway companies. In 1917 NUR men launched the monthly journal New Way and developed the most articulate rank and file movement in Ireland during these years. 
As food supplies worsened alarmingly in the winter of 1916/17, the government introduced tillage orders under the Corn Production Act, obliging farmers to bring at least 10 percent of their arable land under the plough in 1917, and a further 5 percent in 1918. Tillage being labour intensive, the Act gave farm workers a scarcity value. An Agricultural Wages Board was established in September 1917 to determine compulsory minimum pay and conditions. The food supply crisis gave Congress a social purpose and widened the ambit of industrial struggle. Workers, especially NUR men, responded to profiteering by setting up consumer co-operatives which, though limited in scale, and mostly of brief duration, were of demonstrative importance for the inchoate anti-capitalist sentiment welling up in popular consciousness. As unrest spread, the coincidence of pay claims from so many disparate occupations turned wage movements into ‘the wages movement’. 
Trends towards general action first cohered in Dublin in October 1917 when strike notices affecting 2,000-3,000 employees were pending. Murphy’s Irish Independent feared another 1913. Dublin trades council offered to co-ordinate demands and promote the convening of unions in industrial groups. The ITGWU especially, responded to the new opportunities. Re-organised in 1917, the union had mushroomed to 120,000 members by 1920, half of them in agriculture.​[58]​ 
	In what ways was Labour syndicalist? There were still no card carrying syndicalists in Ireland, and the term was rarely used, though “industrial unionism”, “OBU” (One Big Union), “co-operative commonwealth”, and “workers’ republic” were coming into common currency. The leadership of Congress, in which O’Brien was central, was happy to be radical only as long as it led to trade union growth. Again, it is in the character of Labour activity and policy, in the revival of Larkinism and the adoption of Connolly’s industrial unionism, that the syndicalist footprint becomes evident. 
Tactically, there was a spontaneous resurgence of Larkinite methods of sympathetic action. In some cases this extended generalized action. Between 1917 and 1920 there were eighteen local general strikes, mainly in small towns where almost all workers had joined the ITGWU and put forward common wage demands. During these strikes the town was usually taken over by the strike committee, which controlled business and transport through a system of permits. The permits were a means of getting everyone – including employers – to accept the authority of the union as well as enforcing solidarity. 
Workplace seizures – or soviets as they were called – almost all involving the ITGWU, emerged from November 1918 onwards, substantially as strike tactics but indicating too a political ambition. The most extensive seizure, that of thirteen Limerick creameries in 1920, was a well planned affair directed by three socialist ITGWU officials. On 16 May a red flag was hoisted over the central creamery at Knocklong and a banner proclaimed: “We make butter, not profits. Knocklong Creamery Soviet”. The latest ITGWU paper, the Watchword of Labour, compared the creamery soviets with the takeover of the FIAT car works in Turin in 1920, though it conceded that Turin represented “an advance on Knocklong”.​[59]​ Strikes, especially in rural areas, were also more likely to accompanied by sabotage or violence during these years.
Syndicalism was evident too in efforts to develop a working class counter-culture, through co-operatives, May Day parades, festivals (aeríochtaí), and labour newspapers. Liberty Hall tried to revive Larkin’s ideas on alternative morality. Its annual report for 1919 directed members to conceive of the union “as a social centre, round which they can build every activity of their existence, and which, wisely used, can be made to remedy all their grievances”. In 1919 trade unions funded the James Connolly Labour College, which enrolled over 200 students in classes in history, economics, and public administration. An appeal for lecturers in the Watchword of Labour advised that “the working class outlook” was an essential requirement “for unless ye become as proletarians ye cannot enter the Workers’ Republic”. The College flourished up to November 1920, when it was raided and ransacked by the British military.​[60]​ 
One measure of the greater profile of workers at this time is Catholic Church’s heightened interest in the social question. The Catholic publication, the Irish Messenger, published twenty eight pamphlets on the Church and labour in 1918, compared with five in 1913. There was even, mirabile dictu, an academic study of labour, George O’Brien’s Labour Organisation (1921). Another book on labour from an Irish academic would not appear until 1973!
The syndicalist imprint was particularly marked on Labour strategy. By 1918 the ITGWU was facing an entirely novel problem for an Irish union: how to make best advantage of the tens of thousands of workers flooding into the union. It turned to Connolly’s Socialism Made Easy for an answer. Part II of this beautifully clear pamphlet gave Liberty Hall a project to modernize the entire movement. On 1 July 1918, the ITGWU issued The Lines of Progress, a pamphlet intended to “advance Connolly's OBU idea” in order to develop “a scientific solution to the Labour question”. “With this machine [the OBU] in their possession”, it promised, “the workers of Ireland can break all their chains with ease and from the mere rallying cry of political parties turn Freedom into a glorious reality”.​[61]​ In 1921 the ITGWU published the first Irish edition of Socialism Made Easy together with other Connolly writings on industrial unionism in the pamphlet The Axe to the Root. Industrial unionism was also promoted in the NUR’s New Way.​[62]​ 
The impact of change was unmistakeable at the 1918 annual ITUC: 240 delegates attended, compared with ninety nine the previous year. O’Brien’s presidential address strained to strike a historic note, eulogizing Connolly and his influence on “the great Russian Revolution”. The delegates passed unanimously a motion of support for the Bolsheviks, peace in Europe, and self-determination for all peoples, and the Congress took as its objective the promotion of working class organisation socially, industrially, and politically in co-operatives, trade unions, and a political party. At a special conference in November 1918, Congress changed its name to the Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Congress, and adopted a socialist programme, demanding collective ownership of wealth and democratic management of production. 
In February 1919, a special congress met to co-ordinate a “Proposed United National Wages and Hours Movement”, and in August the ITUC voted to transform itself into a single Irish Workers’ Union. Structured in ten industrial sectors, the union, through its political and industrial activities, aimed to realize “the taking over control of industry by the organised working class”.​[63]​ Ultimately, Congress failed to surmount sectionalism and give effect to the “Wages and Hours Movement” or the Irish Workers’ Union. It was an opportunity wasted, as unions would never be as united again for another twenty years.
	Setbacks in these heady times seemed inconsequential, as Labour looked certain to become a major player in the new Ireland. No one knew what economic disasters lay around the corner. But it is not being wise after the event to criticize Labour for failing to take better advantage of the national revolution. Despite Connolly and Larkin, Labour never rid itself of the notion – deeply embedded in its psyche during the height of anglicization – that socialism and nationalism were dichotomous. While willing to go with the flow of popular sentiment, it was reluctant to lead opinion on the national question, or bargain with nationalists. 
The independence struggle radicalized Labour, but equally, Labour squandered its chances to demand more of it. Congress’s main interventions came in three general strikes. On 23 April 1918, workers struck against the extension of conscription to Ireland.​[64]​ The success of Ireland's first general strike made Labour seem a power in the land. The next three months witnessed a tremendous upsurge of union membership. A second national strike followed on 1 May 1919 “for international proletarian solidarity and self-determination for all peoples”. 
Labour’s finest hour came on 12 April 1920, when it called an immediate indefinite general strike for the release of political prisoners on hunger strike. Co-ordinated by workers’ councils, many of which assumed a “soviet” style command of local government for the occasion, the stoppage was a spectacular demonstration of Labour discipline. Fearing the infection of the Sinn Féin struggle with “Bolshevism”, the authorities released the prisoners after two days. Though prompted by a national issue, the strike uncovered the social revolutionary dynamic bubbling at the base of the movement. As the Manchester Guardian remarked on 20 April: “The direction of affairs passed during the strike to these [workers’] councils, which were formed not on a local but on a class basis…It is no exaggeration to trace a flavour of proletarian dictatorship about some aspects of the strike”. 
There were also three major rank-and-file initiatives. In April 1919, the Limerick trades council co-ordinated a nine-day general strike “against British militarism”.​[65]​ The Irish Automobile Drivers' and Mechanics' Union struck in November in protest at the introduction of compulsory permits for vehicle drivers; a move by the authorities designed to assist the monitoring of transport. Dockers, and then railwaymen, commenced a seven month selective stoppage in May 1920, refusing to handle or convey British munitions.​[66]​ The only concession that Labour wanted – and received – from Sinn Féin was the neutrality of the IRA towards direct action in furtherance of the wages movement. It was assumed that once the national revolution was completed, class politics would come into its own.

Syndicalism falters
Even as the revolution approached its climax, syndicalism started to falter in the slump. Massive expansion of the world's productive capacity during World War I, followed by a further increase in output to meet the first demands of a peace-time market, led to a crisis of overproduction in the autumn of 1920. Food prices were the first to tumble, causing a severe depression in agriculture. During 1921, Irish manufacturing trade was almost halved. By December, over 26 percent of workers were idle. Rising unemployment depressed consumer demand, sending the economy tail spinning into long-term recession. Employers clamoured for the restoration of pre-war wage levels. In Britain, wages were getting “back to normal” following the collapse of the Triple Alliance of railwaymen's, miners', and transport unions on “Black Friday”. A similar pattern was anticipated in Ireland, with the railwaymen providing the initial sacrifice following government decontrol of the railways on 14 August 1921. Largely fulfilled in Northern Ireland, employer expectations were frustrated in the south by the effect with which militancy could be deployed in the near anarchic conditions obtaining up to 1923.​[67]​ 
 	The 1921 congress pledged to “hold the harvest” of wage gains, and urged the formation of inter-union committees on a local and industrial basis to co-ordinate resistance to wage cuts. Speaker after speaker affirmed their conviction in industrial unionism as a strategic riposte to the employers' counter-attack, and declared that they would have no “Black Fridays” in Ireland. But when it came to the crunch, it became a sauve qui peut. Irish unions, especially the ITGWU, exploited the readiness of the amalgamateds to accept wage cuts in line with the more rapidly falling pay rates in Britain. 
By 1922, a deep and persistent Anglophobia had crept into inter-union rivalry, aggravated by the inaction of British Labour in the face of sectarian disturbances in Ulster and its stubborn intention to remain in post-colonial Ireland. Nor was the squabbling confined to Anglo-Irish friction. Inter-union competition for a dwindling pool of members soured industrial unionism: the OBU, the cynics said, meant “O’Brien’s Union”. Militancy in the absence of effecting policing enabled workers to put up a dogged fight, and the ITGWU had the best record of any union in this respect: remarkably, it still held 100,000 members in 1922, most with peak wage rates. 
But Labour went down, section by section, slowly but surely succumbing to the wage-cutting offensive. The last phase of the industrial war was the “autumn crisis” of 1923, when about 20,000 workers took strike action or were locked out. By December 1923 it was all over. General unions were in severe decline, and trade unionism in agriculture was near collapse. Congress membership had fallen to 175,000 by 1924, and withered to 92,000 by 1929. 
	Trade unions were not just defeated, they were discredited. In many instances, workers had pressed for tougher action, and then blamed the inevitable retreat on leadership betrayal. Over eighty soviets were declared in 1922, for example, but the ITGWU let them be crushed by the Free State army with scarcely a protest. To have pledged so much and delivered so little led to disillusionment with syndicalism and all that went with the “red flag times”. 
In the cruellest twist of fate, the debacle was compounded by Larkin. Psychologically, Larkin never recovered from the 1913 lockout, and it led his egotism to degenerate into egomania. After his return to Ireland in April 1923, he set about restoring his old command of what he regarded as ‘his’ union. Neither O’Brien nor the ITGWU executive were willing to stomach his domineering ways, and with Big Jim it was a case of “rule or ruin”. In June, with the ITGWU steeling itself for the employers’ “big push”, he attacked the union executive and, making little effort to rationalize his action ideologically, launched a campaign of vilification against the ITGWU and Congress leadership that would fester for fifty years.​[68]​ 
The Labour Party too paid a price. Its impressive 21 percent of the vote in June 1922 – its first general election – was grounded on the post-1917 advance of trade unionism. Over the next twelve months the parliamentary party failed to make itself relevant to the industrial war. The general election of August 1923 saw its vote plummet to 11 percent. Coincidentally, the party’s vote would average 11 percent over the rest of the century. While Labour had known defeat and disillusion before, the depth and scale of the 1923 catastrophe was unique.
	What survived of revolutionism in the Labour movement followed Larkin into communism. The Bolsheviks had been very popular in Ireland initially, not least for their opposition to the world war and support for national self-determination. Communism obviously influenced trade unionists in the declaration of soviets, and the ITUC’s foreign policy was markedly pro-Soviet up to 1922. There was also a Bolshevik faction in the Socialist Party of Ireland (SPI), which O’Brien revived in 1917. Formed in 1909, the SPI had been led by Connolly from 1910, and it served O’Brien’s purpose to take up his hero’s mantle.​[69]​ 
In another reflection of Labour’s pre-occupation with trade unionism at this time, the SPI’s potential was severely neglected. Roddy Connolly, son of James, seized control of the party in 1921 and affiliated it to the Communist International, or Comintern, as the Communist Party of Ireland.​[70]​ Larkin had the communists dissolve the party in 1924 in favour of his own group, the Irish Worker League. He remained more a syndicalist than a Leninist, but he never had much interest in theory in any case, and saw communism as the old class struggle in an apparently more effective format. The Comintern had high hopes of Larkin, and prospects looked good. 
When Peter Larkin launched the Workers’ Union of Ireland in June 1924 – during his brother’s absence in Russia – 16,000 workers, two thirds of ITGWU members in Dublin, defected to the union. There was now a defined communist constituency in Dublin. The Irish Worker League, with some 500 supporters, affiliated to the Comintern. The Workers’ Union joined the Red International of Labour Unions, the Profintern. A further 5,000 workers were affiliated to the “all-red” Dublin trades council – so called for its sympathy with the Bolsheviks – and which, in these suicidally fractious times stood in opposition to the ITGWU led Dublin Workers’ Council. 
The Comintern deemed the 14,000 strong post-Civil War IRA to be another propitious field. There were certainly possibilities of harnessing the foot soldiers of the defeated Labour and republican movements into a new radical force. But Larkin’s personality problems prevented him from making anything of the material at his disposal, and he was powerful enough, in Dublin and Moscow, to ensure that if little could be done with him, nothing would be done without him. Extraordinary wrangles between himself and Moscow culminated in a break with the Comintern and Profintern in 1929. He eventually sought a measure of rehabilitation in the mainstream Labour movement. At a personal level, his retreat from Moscow was timely. Pope Pius XI appealed for a vigorous anti-communism in 1930, and the Irish Catholic clergy responded fiercely, crippling the Comintern’s efforts to re-build a party in Ireland. The window of opportunity between the defeat of syndicalism and the re-emergence of a conservative social consensus had closed.

An industrial unionist postscript
Syndicalism was dead, and its orphan, Irish Labour, inherited some awkward anomalies from the failure to complete the industrial unionist project and from the 1920-22 constitutional settlement. The amalgamateds continued to represent about 25 percent of trade unionists in the Free State, and over 80 percent in Northern Ireland. The ITUC remained an all-Ireland body, but scarcely played any role in the North up to the 1940s. The multiplicity of unions and the amalgamateds remained a serious problem, weakening the labour movement. 
Unions enjoyed a recovery in the 1930s. The Sinn Féin split over the Anglo-Irish treaty had led the majority faction to re-form as Cumann na nGaedheall (“the Irish Party”). Another split in 1926 saw moderates breakaway from the rump of Sinn Féin to launch Fianna Fáil (“Soldiers of Destiny”). Politics now assumed the classic post-colonial format, with Cumann na nGaedheal representing comprador elements favouring the continuation of economic relations with the metropole, and Fianna Fáil demanding the reduction of dependency on Britain though industrialization behind tariff walls. The return of a Fianna Fáil government in 1932, with the support of the Labour Party, led to industrial expansion on an import-substitution basis. 
However, opportunities for new members generated more inter-union rivalry, which became interwoven with rising tension between Irish- and British-based unions. Under government pressure to reform, and worried that Fianna Fáil intended to further its industrialization programme on a cheap wages policy, the ITUC considered options for reorganisation. A proposal to restructure the ITUC unions into industrial unions was opposed by the amalgamateds and defeated by a largely British union bloc, leading to a split in the ITUC in 1945. While the breach was healed in 1959, significant union restructuring only took place in the 1980s and 1990s – and then due to adverse market forces rather than to industrial unionist ideals.

Conclusion
Viewed in a UK setting, the impact of syndicalism on Ireland becomes not merely intelligible but typical. Syndicalists had the choice of infiltrating existing unions – “boring from within” – or forming their own unions. Where the latter policy was adopted, they were usually compelled to operate on the fringes of the existing labour movement, often among economically marginal sectors of the workforce. The Industrial Workers of the World’s (IWW’s) strongholds lay in the western states of America among miners and migrant workers. In Canada, a clear division emerged in post​war unrest between the craft unions, based on the traditional industries of the eastern provinces, and the One Big Union (OBU) which originated in British Columbia and relied on newly organised workers. Farm labourers made up almost half of the Unione Sindicale Italiana’s (the Italian Syndicalist Union’s, or USI) pre-war membership.​[71]​ In South Africa, syndicalists were more successful in organising outside the mainstream unions than in “boring from within”.​[72]​ As an undeveloped region of an advanced industrial country, semi-integrated in its popular culture, but politically deviant and economically distinct, with employers prepared to accept craft unions but opposed to the unionization of labourers, Ireland offered a very representative location for a mass syndicalist movement. 
Where the Irish example compared poorly was in the weakness of its ideological core and theoretical articulation. Its transient popularity relied on a conjuncture of factors: the coincidence of Labour disenchantment with British-based unions, the presence of two exceptional leaders, Connolly and Larkin, in two periods of exceptionally intense class conflict in Europe, the first of which, 1907 to 1914, was profoundly influenced by syndicalism, and the growth of separatist nationalism. 
For all that, few national Labour movements can be said to owe their very existence to syndicalism: without it, Ireland, like Scotland and Wales, would have retained a London-centred trade unionism. Shorn of its revolutionism, industrial unionism remained a theme in Irish Labour thinking on strategy up to the 1970s. The last echo of syndicalism was lost in 1990, when the ITGWU and the Workers’ Union of Ireland merged to became the Services, Industrial, Professional, and Technical Union, and Liberty Hall discontinued the badge marked “ITGWU-OBU”. 
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